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INTRODUCTION
The United States has never been a world leader in social policy initiatives, and
assistance to the poor is no exception. This regard of the U.S. government evolves, in
part, from America’s historical values of limited government and personal responsibility
(Belz, 1992). Social policy for the poor in the United States has traditionally relied on
less than generous income maintenance programs accompanied by asset limits.
Nevertheless, social policy proposals in the last decade have witnessed the
emergence of more investment–oriented policy strategies. For example, Sherraden’s
(1991) work on asset-based welfare proposes policy that aids and encourages saving and
asset accumulation among the poor, under the assumption that acquisition and ownership
of assets improve economic, psychological, and social well-being.
Although current welfare programs serve as a partial safety net by providing for
the immediate needs of the poor, they are intended only for short-term maintenance and
are not designed to lift people out of poverty. In order to rise out of poverty and keep
from falling back in, poor people have to achieve and maintain long-term financial
security. Asset-based welfare is a developmental approach that may keep people from
becoming impoverished as well as providing an opportunity out of poverty by offering
mechanisms that help poor people save and build assets. Moreover, because assets can
be passed on to children and other family members, the financial security of future
generations may be improved. Approximately one-half of wealth first reaches its owners
through intergenerational transfers, but almost none of this wealth reaches poor
households (Wilhelm, 2001). Some researchers claim that the percentage of wealth
accumulation due to intergenerational transfers—specifically in the form of inheritance
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and gifts—is close to 80 percent (see Olive and Shapiro, 1997). The amount of asset
accumulation in households also varies depending on several individual characteristics
including age, earnings, family size and composition, race and one’s level of education.
Another important influence in individual asset accumulation may be formal
institutions. However, the study of institutions as a predictor of asset accumulation is
only starting to emerge. Although a larger body of institutional theory exists that focuses
on the influence of societal institutions on individual behaviors and outcomes (e.g.,
Gordon, 1980; Green, 1991; Neale, 1987), there is very little research that explicitly
connects institutions to individual asset or wealth accumulation. Yet, according to Neale
(1987), “motives lead people to engage in particular activities, but what they do and how
they do it depend upon the structure of institutions” (p.1188). In essence, people make
choices based on their own preferences, but their choices are shaped by the rules and
norms of institutions.
This paper contributes to the emerging research on the role of institutions in
individual asset and wealth accumulation. It provides a closer examination of the
institutional theory of saving as an important framework that may help explain the saving
performance and asset accumulation of low-income households in the United States.
Specifically, the paper answers the following key question: Controlling for income and
several measurable individual characteristics, do institutions matter in influencing the
saving behavior and asset accumulation of low-income households?
BACKGROUND
The institutional theory of saving suggests that institutional factors greatly
influence individual’s ability to save. According to this theory, saving and asset
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accumulation are primarily a result of institutional arrangements that involve explicit
connections, rules, incentives and subsidies (Sherraden, 1991). Several theorists maintain
that institutions matter in shaping and influencing opportunities and behaviors (see Neale
1987; North 1990; Sherraden, 1991; Weaver and Rockman 1993; Beverly and Sherraden
1999; Peters, 1999). This suggested link between institutions and financial well-being
may have important implications in social policy. For example, Sherraden (1991)
observes, the middle-class “participates in retirement pension systems … not [as] a
matter of making superior choices. Instead, a priori choices are made by social policy,
and individuals walk into the pattern than has been established” (p.127). Given the
premise of institutional theory, this paper posits that low-income households are not able
to save and accumulate assets primarily because they do not have the same institutional
opportunities that higher-income households receive. Otherwise, provided with access to
the same institutional frameworks that their higher-income counterparts utilize, lowincome households might be in position to save and accumulate assets. It is against this
background that the institutional question in this paper is being addressed.
The answer to the above institutional question is important for at least two
reasons: First, one would be justified to argue that because saving is hard for most
people, it is even harder for those with low incomes. Therefore, the ability to clarify the
role of formal institutions in facilitating the saving performance and asset accumulation
of low-income households would be a step in the right direction. This clarification may
help initiate the move toward more inclusive social policy and program proposals which
could provide low-income households with the same opportunities to participate in
saving and asset accumulation programs as their higher-income counterparts. Second,
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given the on-going discussion in the policy arena about an ownership society, which
includes low-income households (Boshara, R., Cramer, R., & Parrish, L., 2005), results
from this study may contribute to the debate by providing knowledge on how programs
and policies toward an ownership society could be structured, tested and implemented.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Traditional Theories of Saving
Two of the more recognized economic theories of saving are: (1) the life-cycle
hypothesis (LHC) (Ando & Modigliani, 1963; Modigliani & Ando, 1957; Modigliani &
Brumberg, 1954) and, (2) the permanent-income hypothesis (Friedman, 1957). These
theories view savings as a way of balancing the fluctuation of household resources for
consumption throughout a lifetime, suggesting that when income is greater than
consumption, individuals save, and when income is less than consumption, individuals
dissave. The LHC, for example, assumes that consumption and saving patterns reflect an
individual’s age or stage within the life cycle, with a significant amount of saving
occurring in the middle years.
In addition to the economic theories mentioned above, there are the sociopsychological theories of saving (Cohen, 1994; Duesenberry, 1949; Katona, 1975).
These theories posit that individual’s preferences change in response to economic and
social variations.
Although there is reason to believe that saving is an attribute of individual traits,
preferences and income relative to consumption, studies have begun to arise explicitly
acknowledging the role of formal institutional mechanisms in influencing the saving
performance of individuals. In other words, individual attributes and income may not be
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enough in explaining the saving behavior of individuals. Institutions—in the form of
policies and programs—may be equally important. 1
The Role of Institutions in the United States
Values and beliefs are often incorporated into institutions that guide societies
along certain economic, political, and ideological paths (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Because
formal institutions in the public sector are governed by the political structures within a
nation, institutional choices play a critical role in the welfare of a nation’s citizens,
particularly their financial well-being. In the United States, the guiding principles are
based on a democratic-capitalist government that has traditionally supported financial
growth through personal ownership and open competition (Hill & Hill, 2001). The idea
of financial security through the investment and growth of personal assets is an
established and familiar concept in the United States.
Throughout U.S. history, the government has played an active role in encouraging
citizens to accumulate assets, most often by offering incentives through the tax system.
For example, the Homestead Act of 1852 was one of the first major asset-building
policies in the United States. Under minimal conditions, this Act provided 160 acres of
land to citizens of the United States. In 1913 as part of the establishment of income
taxes, deductions for home mortgage interest and property taxes were established. In
recent years, tax subsidies have been offered for pension plan contributions such as the
exclusion of employment-sponsored pension plan contributions and earnings and the
deferment of Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and Keogh Plans. Consequently,
1

In this paper, the term "institution" is used in a particular sense of formal policy and program
arrangements. The usage does not include informal social arrangements or social norms. We take this focus
because it has direct public policy implications. That is the purpose of this applied research. Thus, our
theoretical perspective is purposefully selected for both intellectual and applied reasons.
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the influence of institutions in public policy has the ability to make considerable changes
in the well-being of individuals. And although the poor are not deliberately excluded
from these benefits, their access is limited, greatly narrowing their participation
opportunities (Howard, 1997; Sherraden, 1991, 2001; Seidman, 2001).
Institutional Theory of Saving
The institutional theory of saving recognizes the important role that institutions
play in savings. It advances five institutional constructs as being instrumental in
predicting individual saving and asset accumulation, particularly among low-income
households: 1) access, 2) information, 3) incentives, 4) facilitation, and 5) expectations
(Sherraden, 1991; Beverly and Sherraden, 1999; Sherraden, 1999; Sherraden et al.,
2003).
Access. Access to institutional mechanisms that make the depositing process
more available may have an impact on asset accumulation. When access to these means
is permitted, savings rates are likely to be higher. Some researchers (Cagan, 1965;
Carroll & Summers, 1987) suggest that the availability of institutionalized saving
opportunities encourages savings because it brings about an awareness of the need for
and benefits of saving.
Information. Another important institutional determinant of saving is financial
information, normally offered through financial education. The assertion here is that
when people are made more aware of their saving options and outcomes, savings will be
higher. Often financial education is provided to employees whose companies offer
pension plans. Studies report that when financial education is offered to employees,
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participation levels, as well as contribution levels in some cases, are higher (Bayer,
Bernheim, & Scholz, 1996; Bernheim & Garrett, 1996).
Incentives. Incentives are inducements to motivate higher savings. Interest rates
and rates of return on investments are the most familiar. Although empirical evidence
concerning the effects of incentives is inconsistent (see Engen, Gale & Scholz, 1996;
Hubbard & Skinner, 1996; Poterba, Venti & Wise, 1996), the proposition is that,
generally, an increase in the rate of return will cause an increase in savings.
Facilitation. These are institutional arrangements that provide mechanisms that
make saving more manageable and convenient. Empirical evidence on facilitation is
limited at this time. But overall, the proposition is that these arrangements will more
likely increase individual savings. One study on 401(k) participation finds participation
and contributions rates to be higher after the employer started automatically enrolling
employees into the 401(k) plans (Madrian & Shea, 2000).
Expectations. Expectations, as an institutional determinant of saving, refer to the
specific saving goals, targets and rules communicated to participants by the programs.
Individuals with specific saving expectations are more likely to save more than
individuals with no saving expectations.
Based on this theory, Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) were developed
as a policy initiative that could help provide poor people with the opportunity to save
money (Sherraden, 1990; 1991). These programs—in line with institutional theory—
offer matched savings for participants with specific asset goals in mind including
homewonership, education, and small business development. In addition, financial
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education is offered to help participants gain more knowledge about available financial
resources and to help them reach their asset goals.
DATA
Beginning in 1997, a national demonstration, known as the American Dream
Demonstration (ADD) was initiated to test the IDA model. ADD was the first large-scale
test of IDAs and provides the most comprehensive data on IDAs to date. It involved 14
programs selected through a competitive process to design, implement, and run IDA
programs (see Table 1).
The study followed over 2,000 low-income (200 percent of poverty or less)
participants across the United States for eight years (1997-2005). Each program site
operated their programs for four years with an additional four years of post-program
research. Participant enrollment began in July of 1997 and continued throughout the
program. Participants were defined as enrollees if they had an account statement in the
data management program, Management Information System for Individual
Development Accounts (MIS IDA) and included those individuals who exited the
program without a matched withdrawal (Schreiner et al., 2002). Program staff collected
monitoring data with MIS IDA, which incorporated a quality control component
(Johnson et al., 2001). Savings data came from monthly passbook savings account
records from depository institutions. The socio-economic and demographic information
used in this study was gathered at time of enrollment. Participants were allowed to use
their accumulated savings for home purchases, home improvements, micro-enterprise,
retirement and education.
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[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

ADD used an extensive multi-method research design to gather as much
information as possible concerning the effectiveness of the programs in terms of the
communities, participants and administration in order to inform IDA policy and program
development outside of ADD (Sherraden et al., 2000). The largest program site, located
in Oklahoma, used an experimental design and was the only site with a control group.
However, because this particular study looks at institutional effects within IDA programs,
all the ADD programs are utilized.
For this study, two data sources both originating from ADD are used. The first
source comes from the data set described above. The second source is a more detailed
collection of program information obtained through an additional survey conducted on
the 14 ADD programs. The survey was administered using a combination of face-to-face
and telephone interviews with personnel from the ADD programs. The interview
questions were derived based on the institutional constructs suggested in Sherraden
(1991) and Beverly & Sherraden’s (1999) institutional theory of saving. The survey
consisted of both open-and closed-ended questions. The open-ended questions were
designed to help clarify some of the closed-ended questions. Once completed, the
program survey data was merged with the ADD participant data. The total participant
sample size for this study is 2,211.
Dependent Variable: Saving Performance
Saving may be measured in a variety of ways depending on which aspect of the
process is of interest. In this study, we use average monthly net deposit (AMND), as the
measure of saving performance. This measure is consistent with measures used in prior
Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis
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research on ADD (see Sherraden et al., 2000; Schreiner et al., 2001; Schreiner et al, 2002;
Ssewamala & Sherraden, 2004).
AMND measures the specific dollar amount of a participant’s average monthly
deposit. It is net deposit divided by the number of participation months, thus controlling
for length of participation in an IDA program. Higher AMND implies higher savings.
AMND = Deposit + Interest-Unmatched withdrawals-Unmatchable deposits
Total number of months of participation
The variable net deposit, used to calculate AMND, is defined as deposits plus
earned interest minus unmatched withdrawals. Net deposit includes matched
withdrawals, but excludes unmatchable deposits in excess of the match cap 2 or after the
time cap period. 3 Deposits over the match cap and after the time cap are excluded
because, although the extra deposited amounts are considered savings, they are not
considered IDA savings. Given that participants may have other types of savings that are
not included in the saving measure for this study, adding in the extra IDA savings might
bias the results. The average AMND for this study population is $18.44.
Independent Variables: Participant Demographic and Financial Characteristics
Participant demographic and financial characteristics are used as controls in this
analysis. They include age (a one joint spline dividing participants who are 40 years of
age and younger, and those participants who are 41 years of age or older), gender,
dependency ratio, race/ethnicity, education level, employment, marital status, rural
residency, car ownership, home ownership, business ownership, ownership of checking
or savings account, net worth and never on TANF (public assistance use) (see Table 2 for
2

Match cap is the ceiling on the matchable deposits possible for a designated time period.
Time cap is the number of months after opening an account that participants are allowed matchable
deposits.
3
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details). As mentioned earlier, all of these variables are measured at the time of
enrollment.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
As indicate in Table 2, eighty percent of participants in ADD are female, 44
percent are African American, 40 percent are Caucasian, and 9 percent are Hispanic. In
addition, 22 percent of ADD participants are married while 47 percent have never
married and 28 percent are divorced or separated. Fifty-eight percent of participants were
employed full-time at baseline, 24 percent were employed part-time and 10 percent were
unemployed. In regard to education, 15 percent of participants do not have a high school
diploma, 25 percent have a high school diploma, 37 percent have attended some college
and 23 percent have a college degree. Overall, compared to the U.S. low-income
population, ADD participants are more likely to be female, African American, single, and
employed as well as more educated.
Independent Variables: Institutional Characteristics
Access. Number of deposit locations is used to measure this concept. It is a
continuous variable that identifies the number of deposit locations that were available to
participants. The hypothesis: the greater the number of deposit locations, the greater the
saving performance.
Information. Hours of financial education and peer mentoring group are the two
variables used to measure information. Financial education for participants was provided
by each program individually. Because several different options were available in each
program, hours taken varied between the participants; therefore, hours of financial
education is a continuous variable that provides the number of financial education hours
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taken by each participant. A multi-joint spline is used creating 3 different financial
education segments: 1 to 6 hours, 7-12 hours, 13 or more hours. In addition, a dummy
variable was created for people with no hours of financial education. Peer mentoring
groups is a dichotomous variable that determines whether a program offered peer group
mentoring programs to IDA participants in addition to financial education. The
hypotheses: (1) the greater the number of financial education hours attended, the greater
the saving performance and (2) the more peer modeling and information sharing, the
greater the saving performance.
Incentives. In this study, match rate is used as the measure for incentives. Match
rate is a continuous variable that describes the match rates offered to participants in the
IDA programs. The match rates ranged from 1:1 to 6:1. For the purpose of this study,
dummy variables are created to examine the influence of each level of match rate. The
variables are 1:1, 2:1, 3:1+. The 3:1+ variable represents the match rates of 3:1 and
above. The hypothesis: the higher the match rate, the greater the saving performance.
Facilitation. This construct is measured by direct deposit, a dichotomous
variable. It identifies whether a program offers direct deposit to IDA participants for
their IDA accounts. The hypothesis: the more automatic the system (such as automatic
deposit), the greater the saving performance.
Expectations. Expectations is measured by monthly savings target. Monthly
savings target is a continuous variable that represents the ratio of total match cap to the
time cap. The target is a program feature set by the programs for the participants. The
hypothesis: the higher the monthly savings target, the greater the saving performance.
The institutional variables are shown in Table 3.
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[INSTERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
To address the research question guiding this paper, a hierarchical multivariate
analysis is utilized. This analysis procedure examines the incremental changes of R2 in a
regression model due to the addition of individual variables or blocks of variables
introduced in a specified hierarchy at certain points in the regression (Cohen & Cohen,
1983). Specifically, the measure of saving performance, AMND, is regressed on three
blocks of independent variables. The first block (model 1) consists of the individual
participant characteristics and is entered into the model to determine the variance
explained in AMND without the institutional variables added. The measurable
institutional variables block is introduced in the second model (model 2) to determine the
influence of each of these characteristics on saving performance as well as their unique
contribution as a block to the incremental changes in the variance explained in AMND
when controlling for participant characteristics. In the third block (model 3), program
dummies, which are unmeasured institutional characteristics, are entered to determine
their unique contribution to variance explained in AMND.
The specified hierarchy of this regression model is guided by the theoretical
framework of this study. Based on the institutional explanation of saving behavior, when
institutionalized mechanisms for saving are made available to low-income households,
saving performance will increase in these households. Therefore, it is presumed that
when institutional characteristics are added to the model as a second block, the proportion
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of variance explained will increase significantly from the first block containing only
participant characteristics.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Univariate Analysis
Descriptive statistics were calculated on participant demographic and financial
characteristics as well as institutional characteristics. The full results are reported in
Table 2 and Table 3 above.
Multivariate Analysis
As noted earlier, traditional theories of saving do not specifically address saving
in low-income households nor do they stress the role institutions play in influencing
saving and asset accumulation. Using institutional theory, this paper seeks to contribute
to the emerging research on the role of institutions in individual asset accumulation. In
particular, this paper seeks to specify and test the institutional mechanisms that affect
saving performance in low-income households in IDA programs. In identifying an
institutional approach to saving, each of the existing theories might be integrated into a
coherent theory that also helps explain saving in low-income households.
Consistent with the institutional theory of saving the results suggest that
institutional characteristics are important in the saving behavior of low-income
households. Below is a discussion of the major findings. The results begin with the
individual participant and institutional characteristics and then report on the institutional
block results. The institutional variables entered into the model as a block provide a
better understanding of the variance explained—in saving performance—by institutional
characteristics as a whole.
Participant Demographic Characteristics
Center for Social Development
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Gender, age, marital status, and dependency ratio are not significantly associated
with saving performance (see Table 4 for complete regression results).

[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

Race/ethnicity. Three categories of race have a significant association with
saving performance. Holding other variables in the model constant, compared with
Caucasians, AMND is $3.33 lower for African Americans (b= -3.33, p≤ 0.01) and $6.78
lower for Native Americans (b= -6.78, p≤ 0.01); whereas AMND for Asians is $14.08
higher (b= 14.08, p≤ 0.01). This finding may partly be a reflection of the institutional
discrimination based on race or other differences. In any case, although some racial
groups are saving less than others, the main idea here is that all racial groups are saving
and would even probably do better given more institutional opportunities. Thus,
enforcing inclusive policies like the community reinvestment act (12 U.S.C. 2901,
implemented by regulations 12 CFR parts 25; 228; 345, and 563e) may be helpful in
ensuring that racial minorities more access to institutional forms of saving and asset
accumulation.
Education. Education is significantly related to saving performance. Compared
to those participants who have a college degree (2-year, 4-year, or unspecified), all other
categories are linked with a statistically significant lower AMND. For example,
participants without a high school diploma save $4.45 less than participants with a
college degree (b= -4.45, p≤ 0.01), participants with a high school diploma or GED save
$4.65 less than participants with a college degree (b= -4.65, p≤ 0.01), and participants
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with some college save $4.00 less than participants with a college degree (b= -4.00, p≤
0.01). This relationship may exist because either more education increases financial
sophistication or that increased education as a form of human capital demonstrates future
orientation.
Employment. Only one employment category is significantly associated with
saving performance. Students are linked with a $5.99 increase in AMND compared to
participants who are unemployed (b= 5.99, p≤ 0.01).

One explanation for this

occurrence could be that students may use part of their grant money or student loans to
deposit into their IDAs in lump sums. There may also be some unobserved
characteristics related to students that predispose them more to saving than other groups
of people. For example, students may be more focused toward the future and more savvy
about saving. There are no significant differences on saving performance between
unemployed participants (the reference group) and those employed full time, or those
employed part-time.
Rural residency. Rural residency has a significant relationship with saving
performance. AMND was $5.11 less for participants residing in rural areas compared to
participants living in urban areas (b= -5.11, p≤ 0.01). Grinstein-Weiss and Curley
(2003) report two main challenges that may influence saving outcomes in rural areas.
First, because of the lack of infrastructure in many rural areas, fewer resources are
available to participants in terms of the availability, quality, and flexibility of options,
services, and staff connected with IDAs. Second, distance is an issue. For participants
who live outside of town, attending financial education classes is sometimes a problem
because they either lack transportation or do not have enough time to get from work to
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class because of the distance. Moreover, the transaction costs involved in depositing may
be higher for rural participants because of the distance issue.
Participant Financial Characteristics
Never on TANF, business ownership, income and net worth are all not
significantly related to saving performance (see Tables 4 for complete regression results).
Car ownership. Car ownership is significantly linked to saving performance. Car
owners were linked with a $2.27 higher AMND compared to participants who were not
car owners (b= 2.27, p≤ 0.05).
Home ownership. Owning a home has a significant and positive relationship with
saving performance. Homeowners show a $7.22 higher AMND than those participants
who do not own their own homes (b= 7.22, p≤ 0.01).
Checking or Savings Account. Having either a checking or savings account or
both is significantly related to saving performance. Participants with either a checking
account, savings account or both were associated with over $3 higher in AMND (b=3.40,
p≤ 0.01) than participants who had neither account.
The findings in this study indicate that owning certain forms of assets may be
predictive of saving performance in IDAs. As Sherraden (1991) observes, owning assets
may, “create a cognitive and emotional orientation towards the future and stimulate the
development of other assets” (p.181). Under these assumptions, the initial possession of
assets helps provide a foundation that may encourage greater asset accumulation in the
future. It may also be that ownership of other assets is a proxy for successful financial
functioning that is long-standing.
Institutional Characteristics
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IDAs are formal institutions that are purposely designed to encourage and
facilitate saving and asset accumulation in low-income households. Therefore, the
characteristics that comprise the structure of these institutions should demonstrate a
significant relationship to participants’ saving outcomes. Results of this study, in part,
support this postulation. Table 4 presents the detailed regression results for the
institutional characteristics. Below is a summary of those results.
Access. The findings do not support the hypothesis related to access: the greater
the number of deposit locations, the greater the saving performance. Number of deposit
locations is not significantly related to saving performance.
Information. The findings support both hypotheses related to information: (1) the
more peer modeling and information sharing, the greater the saving performance; and (2)
the greater the number of financial education hours attended, the greater the saving
performance. For those participants who are in programs that offer peer mentoring
groups, AMND is $8.19 higher than for participants in programs that do not have peer
mentoring groups (b= 8.19, p≤ 0.01). The positive association with peer mentoring
groups is an indication that peer encouragement, support, and sharing the challenges and
experiences of the saving process with other participants may be useful. These findings
are consistent with Ssewamala and Sherraden (2004) and with the survey of rural IDA
programs (Grinstein-Weiss & Curley, 2003).
Moreover, the amount of financial education hours attended by participants is
significantly associated with saving performance in two categories. Having attended
between 1 and 6 hours of financial education and having attended between 7 and 12
hours of financial education is significantly associated with AMND. Specifically, for
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each additional hour attended between 1 and 6, AMND increases by $1.23 (b= 1.23, p≤
0.05). For each additional hour between 7 and 12, AMND increases by $1.76 (b= 1.76,
p≤ 0.01). On the other hand, having 13 or more hours of financial education is not
significantly linked to saving performance. These findings support earlier research on
financial education in ADD (Schreiner et al., 2001; Schreiner et al., 2002; Ssewamala &
Sherraden, 2004). Thus, programs should design financial education requirements
accordingly. For example, to maximize the benefits for participants and minimize their
own costs, programs could provide a combination of formal financial education up to
approximately12 hours and establish peer mentoring programs. With this alternative,
participants could receive factual financial information from the classes and emotional
support and encouragement from the peer mentoring programs.
Incentives. The results do not support the incentive hypothesis: the higher the
match rate, the greater the saving performance. The measure of incentives used in this
study, match rates, is not significantly associated with AMND.
Based on these findings, the idea that, according to economic theory, higher
match rates are an incentive to save more is not substantiated. One explanation could be
that programs in ADD set match rates based on how they think participants will save.
For example, programs may set match rates higher if they think participants may save
less. With this approach, participants can still reach their total asset goal because the
higher match rates allows them a higher match amount and, thus, higher total
accumulation. Another explanation is the income effect. Participants might set an end
goal and if the match rate is higher they can save less and still reach their goal. In
general, empirical evidence concerning the effects of incentives is inconsistent (Engen,
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Gale & Scholz, 1996; Hubbard & Skinner, 1996; Poterba, Venti & Wise, 1996). Perhaps
IDA programs should implement additional education to help participants understand the
benefits connected to higher match rates with increased deposits. Another alternative
could be to establish moderate match rates in programs, thus freeing up funds that could
be used more efficiently in other areas of the program, such as allowing for additional
account holders or increasing match caps.
Facilitation. The hypothesis related to facilitation is not supported: the more
automatic the system (such as automatic deposit), the greater the saving performance.
The measure of facilitation used here, direct deposit, is not significantly associated with
saving performance.
Expectation. The expectation hypothesis is supported: the higher the monthly
savings target, the greater the saving performance. For every additional $1 in monthly
savings target, AMND increases by $0.25 (b= 0.25, p≤ 0.01).
These results support institutional theory which suggests that higher match caps
may be associated with higher saving performance because participants mentally convert
match caps into goals (see Schreiner et al., 2001). Using this knowledge, program
administrators may want to emphasize specific objectives and guidelines in their
programs to provide some assistance in maintaining saving goals for participants.
Policymakers and program administrators should concentrate on the right mixture of
conventions to help shape and support participants saving, not mandate it.
Estimated “Block” Contributions to Changes in R2
The results of the hierarchical analysis which regress the dependent variable on
the three blocks of independent variables are presented below (see Table 5).
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[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
As indicated in Table 5, when the block of participant characteristics only are
entered into the first model (model 1), the variance explained in AMND is 16 percent (R2
= 0.16). After the institutional characteristic block is introduced (model 2), the variance
explained increases to 28 percent (R2 = 0.28), indicating a change in R2 of 0.12 or 12
percent. This change is the unique contribution of the measurable institutional
characteristics to the overall model. The change is statistically significant (p≤ 0.01).
These results suggest that institutions are important. Furthermore, when program
dummies (unmeasured program characteristics) are added, R2 significantly increases by
another 3 percent. This change is also statistically significant (p≤ 0.01), indicating that
unobserved program variables are related to saving outcomes, which are most likely
aspects of the IDA programs. These variables might include strong leadership, staff
commitment, staff skill, and other factors. The total variance explained by all three
blocks of independent variables in model 3 is 31 percent (R2 = 0.31).
LIMITATIONS
The following limitations are worth highlighting. Institutional designs of the IDA
programs were not randomly assigned which meant that programs could select their own
design plan, based in part on how they perceived participants’ behavior. In addition,
participants were not randomly chosen to participate. Most of the IDA programs targeted
certain populations; Therefore, the results do not reflect the overall low-income
population. Another limitation is that the socio-economic and participant characteristics
used in this study were collected at enrollment and some of them may have changed
during the course of the program. Again, as mentioned earlier, no comparison group was
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available for all sites. The absence of a comparable control group in this study makes it
impossible to say with confidence that study results are due to IDAs or that IDAs
represent new saving for the household. Lastly, this analysis is based on a short-term
study period. We cannot determine long-term effects without a longer study period.
CONCLUSION
Evidence from ADD indicates that the poor can save. Sufficient evidence exists
to support the creation of institutional mechanisms to encourage the poor to save. In fact,
because of the institutional aspects of ADD, many low-income households were given
the opportunity to save. However, it is not known how many will continue to save once
the program has ended and the saving mechanisms are gone. Looking at the same
situation in a different perspective the question could be asked of higher-income
households: How many upper-income households would save if no institutional
mechanisms for saving opportunities existed for them? In other words, how many people
could or would accumulate savings if there were no 401k plans or IRAs available to
them?
Since the enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (the “welfare reform” law), which gave states the option to
use funds from their block grants for matched saving accounts for the poor without
counting the savings toward means-tested programs asset limits, IDAs have grown
considerably. Over 40 US states have adopted some type of IDA policy (Edwards and
Mason, 2003). The Corporation for Enterprise Development [CFED] (2002) estimates
that by 2002, there were more than 500 IDA programs throughout the United States.
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Results from this study can help policymakers understand the role of institutions,
and create more successful programs to promote saving and asset accumulation among
populations that generally do not have access to institutionalized saving mechanisms.
Tax incentives are already in place to encourage small businesses to locate in
economically distressed areas and promote economic development. These types of
incentives are designed to build assets within low-income communities by creating
affordable housing and stimulating job growth in these regions. Additional incentives
could help support asset development at the individual level. For example, policy
initiatives could be introduced to increase funding for IDAs or provide stronger tax
incentives to businesses that match pension accounts for low-income workers.
Results could also enable policymakers to make more informed decisions
regarding mechanisms to encourage saving under different circumstances, such as in
different population groups or different geographical locations. The ethnicity findings in
this study may represent unobserved characteristics associated with race rather than race
itself. More research should be conducted to determine the specific predictors for each
group so that policymakers can provide the appropriate policy and program designs to
enable each group the opportunity to save more efficiently. For example, incentives
might be given to organizations that target a particular low-income minority group.
Similar to the results with race, findings that point to unique predictors among
different geographic groups can help policymakers design policy and incentives directed
purposely at these specific groups to encourage savings. For example, special tax
incentives could be given to organizations that participate in IDA programs in rural areas
in order to increase funding opportunities in these regions.
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Lastly, empirical evidence provided by studies of this nature may foster interest
and awareness in existing tax policies that are regressive in nature. Policymakers could
make these policies more inclusive so that low-income households could benefit from
them. More refundable tax credits for low-income households would be one mechanism
that could help. This type of policy would avoid the social stigma associated with
programs that are targeted specifically to the poor.
In summary, institutional constructs appear to affect saving performance in IDA
programs. These results, drawaing on institutional theories of saving, have direct
implications for policy as well as practice. IDAs and similar policies and practices can
probably be improved based on this growing body of evidence. Much more remains to
be done in both theoretical development and empirical research for inclusive saving and
asset accumulation to reach its potential.
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Table 1. Host organizations in ADD.
Host Organization

Location

Type of Organization

Targeted Participants for IDAs

ADVOCAP

Fond du Lac, WI

Community action agency

Former AFDC/TANF recipients; the
working poor

Alternatives Federal
Credit Union

Ithaca, NY

Community development credit
union

Single parents; youth

Bay Area IDA
Collaborative (formerly
EBALDC)

Oakland, CA

Collaborative of 13 communitybased organizations

Low-income Asian Americans;
African Americans; Hispanics

Capital Area Asset
Building Corporation
(CAAB)

Washington, D.C.

Collaborative of 8 communitybased organizations

TANF recipients; youth; African
Americans; Hispanics; Asian
Americans

Foundation Communities
(formerly Central Texas
Mutual Housing)

Austin, TX

Not-for-profit housing
organization

Rental property residents; youth

Central Vermont
Community Action
Council (CVCAC)

Barre, VT

Community action agency and
community development
corporation

TANF recipients; youth

Community Action
Project of Tulsa County
(CAPTC)

Tulsa, OK

Community-based anti-poverty
organization

Small-scale: Working families with
children at or below 200% of
poverty.
Large-scale: at or below 150% of
Hispanics; African Americans

Heart of America Family Kansas City, MO
Services

Community-based familyservices agency

Mercy Corps
(formerly Human
Solutions)

Portland, OR

Social-service organization

Rental property residents

MACED/Owsley County
Action Team

Berea, KY

Association of community
development organizations

Rental property residents; the
working poor

Near Eastside IDA
Program

Indianapolis, IN

Social-service organization /
Community development credit
union

Neighborhood residents; youth

Shorebank Corporation

Chicago, IL

Community development bank
with not-for-profit affiliate

Rental property residents; Shorebank
customers

Women’s SelfEmployment Project
(WSEP)

Chicago, IL

Microenterprise development
organization

Low-income, self-employed women;
public-housing residents
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Table 2. ADD participant characteristics.
Mean
(St. Dev.) Percentage

Characteristics
Demographics
Gender
Female
Male

80%
20%

Age
13 to 19
20s
30s
40s
50s
60 to 72

36 (10)
4%
26%
36%
25%
7%
2%

Race/Ethnicity
African American
Asian-American or Pacific Islander
Caucasian
Hispanic
Native American
Other

44%
2%
40%
9%
3%
3%

Marital Status
Never Married
Married
Divorced or Separated
Widowed

47%
22%
28%
2%

Education
No High School Diploma
High School Diploma or GED
Attended Some College
College Degree

15%
25%
37%
23%

Employment
Employed Full-time
Employed Part-time
Student
Unemployed

58%
24%
8%
10%
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Table 2. ADD participant characteristics continued.
Mean
(St. Dev.) Percentage

Characteristics
Household
Household Type
One Adult with Children
One Adult without Children
Two or more Adults with Children
Two or more Adults/No Children
Dependency Ratio

45%
15%
30%
9%
2.3 (1.24)

Rural Residency

14%
Financial

Car Ownership

67%

Home Ownership

17%

Business Ownership

11%

Either Checking or Savings Account

77%

Never Used TANF

61%

Monthly Income

$1,364 (7.01)

Income to Poverty Ratio
0 to 49
50 to 74
75 to 99
100 to 124
125 to 149
150 to 174
175 to 199
200 to 327

105 (.68)
20%
13%
16%
14%
12%
9%
6%
8%

Net Worth
N

$3,136 (194)
2,211
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Table 3. ADD institutional characteristics.
Institutional Characteristics

Mean
(St. Dev.)

Access
Number of Deposit Locations

17 (21.56)

Information
Peer Mentoring Groups

Percentage

34%

Hours of Financial Education Attended
0 Hours
1-6 Hours
7-12 Hours
Over 13 Hours
Incentives
Match Rate
1:1
2:1
3:1 and Over

10 (7.57)
9%
15%
50%
24%
2 (.91)
27%
51%
21%

Facilitation
Program Offered Direct Deposit
Expectations
Monthly Savings Target
N

80%
$42.14 (20.47)
2,211
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Table 4. Hierarchical regression analysis: Individual and institutional Characteristics
and Average Monthly Net Deposit (AMND).
Model 1
Model 2
Independent Variables
Intercept

b

se

b

se

#### **

3.80

#### *

5.00

-1.20

1.23

-1.09

1.16

0.17 *
0.09

0.08
0.11

0.06
0.09

0.08
0.10

-7.13 **
2.78
#### **
-6.82 *
2.93

1.12
1.76
3.24
2.78
2.76

-3.33 **
4.51
14.08 **
-6.78 **
5.08

1.12
1.68
3.03
2.59
2.59

Education
Completed a Degree (reference group)
No High School Diploma
-7.28 **
High School Diploma or GED
-6.86 **
Attended Some College
-5.13 **

1.62
1.35
1.22

-4.45 **
-4.65 **
-4.00 **

1.52
1.27
1.14

Employment
Unemployed (reference group)
Employed Full-time
Employed Part-time
Student

1.61
1.70
2.15

-0.78
0.78
5.99 **

1.54
1.60
2.01

Participant Characteristics:
Demographics
Female
Age
40 or under
Over 40
Race/Ethnicity
Caucasian (reference group)
African American
Hispanic
Asian-American or Pacific Islander
Native American
Other Ethnicity

1.36
2.87
5.03 *

Marital
Married (reference group)
Single - Never Married
Divorced, Separated, or Widowed

-1.27
0.02

1.32
1.39

-0.86
0.30

1.24
1.30

Dependency Ratio

-0.49

0.42

-0.66

0.39

Rural Residency

-4.16 **

1.41

-5.11 **

1.43
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Table 4. Hierarchical regression analysis: Individual and institutional Characteristics
and Average Monthly Net Deposit (AMND) continued.
Model 1
Model 2
Independent Variables

b

se

b

se

Participant Characteristics: Financial
Asset Ownership
Car
Home
Business
Checking or Savings Account

3.61 **
6.30 **
1.90
6.24 **

1.07
1.46
1.48
1.16

2.27 *
7.22 **
0.79
3.40 **

1.01
1.41
1.41
1.10

Never on TANF

-0.12

1.02

0.44

0.96

Monthly Income

0.14

0.07

0.14

0.07

-2.08

1.39

0.00

0.00

Number of Deposit Locations (access)

0.03

0.03

Peer Mentoring Groups (information)

8.19 **

1.16

Financial Education (information)
0 Education Hours
1 to 6 Education Hours
7 to 12 Education Hours
13 or more Education Hours

-0.15
1.23 *
1.76 **
0.01

3.28
0.56
0.26
0.09

Match Rate (incentives)
1:1 (reference group)
2:1
3:1 and Higher

-1.67
-2.06

1.18
1.63

Direct Deposit (facilitation)

0.64

1.40

Monthly Savings Target (expectations)

0.25 **

0.03

Net Worth
Institutional Characteristics

2

R
N

0.16
####

0.28
####

*p≤ .05 **p≤ .01
b = unstandardized coefficient
se = standard error
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Table 5. Hierarchical regression results: Influence of institutional characteristics on
Average Monthly Net Deposit (AMND).
2

Adjusted
R2
R2 ∆

Model

R

Model 1:
Individual Characteristics
Gender, age, race, education, employment,
marital status, dependency ratio, residency,
asset ownership, banking experience,
TANF use, monthly income, and net worth.

0.16

0.15

Model 2:
Individual Characteristics + Institutional
Charateristics
# of deposit locations, peer mentoring groups,
financial education attended, match rate,
direct deposit offered, monthly savings target

0.28

0.27

0.12 **

Model 3:
Individual Characteristics + Institutional
Charateristics + Program Dummies
ADVOCAP, Alternative federal Credit Union,
Bay Area IDA Collaborative, Central Vermont
Community Action Council, Community Action
Project of Tulsa, OK, Foundation Communities,
Heart of America Family Services, Mercy Corps,
MACED, Near Eastside IDA Program, Shorebank
Corporation, Women's Self-Employment Project.
N

0.31

0.29

0.03 **

2,211

**p≤ .01
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